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UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
international CriMinal 
triBunal For the ForMer 
yugoSlavia
CaSeS anD proCeeDingS
On September 27, 2007, the Trial 
Chamber handed down its decision in 
the so-called Vukovar Three case. Mile 
Mrkšic´, Veselin Šljivancˇanin, and Miroslav 
Radic´ were indicted for involvement in the 
abduction of roughly 260 non-Serbs from 
the Vukovar Hospital, and the eventual 
murder and deposit of these individu-
als into mass graves in Ovcˇara. Mrkšic´, 
the commander of all Serb forces in the 
Vukovar area, was sentenced to 20 years 
imprisonment for war crimes, including 
aiding and abetting the murder, torture, 
and cruel treatment of 194 non-Serb pris-
oners of war. Šljivancˇanin, head of the 
security organ of the Guard’s Motorised 
Brigade and Operation Group South, was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment for 
the war crime of aiding and abetting torture 
of prisoners of war. Radic´, the company 
commander of the First Battalion and 
Guards Motorised Brigade, was acquitted 
of charges of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.
Mrkšic´ was found guilty because he 
allowed prisoners to be taken from the 
hospital to Ovcˇara and then withdrew the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) troops 
guarding these prisoners with the knowl-
edge that the local Territorial Defence and 
paramilitary forces intended to harm them. 
Šljivancˇanin was found guilty because he 
failed to secure adequate guards in Ovcˇara 
or to ensure that the JNA guards acted to 
prevent the beating of the prisoners.
After finding that the victims were 
targeted specifically for their known or 
believed involvement with the Croatian 
forces, the Trial Chamber dismissed all 
charges of crimes against humanity. The 
Chamber also found no evidence that the 
three men participated in a joint crimi-
nal enterprise for committing the offenses 
against the prisoners in Vukovar. Following 
the judgment, the mood in Croatia was one 
of disappointment over perceived leniency 
in the sentencing. Many Croatians consider 
the massacre outside of Vukovar to be one 
of the most brazen episodes of violence 
during the war. 
Also on September 27, 2007, the Appeals 
Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s judg-
ment in Limaj et al. This case charged three 
former members of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) for their purported involve-
ment in crimes against both Serb and 
Kosovo Albanian civilians in the KLA-run 
Llapushnik/Lapušnik prison camp between 
May and July 1998. The charges against 
Haradin Bala, a prison guard at the camp, 
were confirmed, and he was sentenced to 
13 years imprisonment for torture, cruel 
treatment and murder. The acquittals of 
Fatmir Limaj and Isak Musliu were also 
upheld because the prosecutor was unable 
to prove that the soldiers were participants 
in a joint criminal enterprise furthering tor-
ture and cruel treatment of prisoners.  
On July 20, 2007, in the interests of jus-
tice, the Tribunal’s Referral Bench revoked 
a decision referring Sredoje Lukic´ to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial. It opted 
instead to try him jointly with his cousin 
Milan Lukic´ at the Tribunal in the Hague. 
Because the two cases are factually similar, 
the Referral Bench believed that holding 
separate trials would be an ineffective use 
of resources, and would also unnecessarily 
exacerbate witness trauma. Milan Lukic´ 
was the leader of the “White Eagles” or 
“Avengers,” a Bosnian Serb paramilitary 
group that exacted a reign of violence 
over the town of Višegrad in southeastern 
Bosnia. Sredoje Lukic´ was a member of 
the group. Both are charged with the brutal 
murders of over 100 Bosnian Muslim civil-
ians in Višegrad.
The trial of Rasim Delic´, former 
commander of the Army of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, began on July 9, 2007. Delic´ 
is one of the most senior members of 
the Bosnian Army to come before the 
Tribunal. He is being tried under a theory 
of command responsibility for the mur-
der, cruel treatment, and rapes of cap-
tured Croat and Serb soldiers and civilians. 
Among other crimes, he is charged with 
failing to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to punish his subordinates who 
captured and executed Bosnian Croat civil-
ians and soldiers in the villages of Maline 
and Bikoši. He is also accused of failing 
to take necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent torture, beatings, murder, and 
decapitation of Bosnian Serb Army sol-
diers and the rape of three women by his 
subordinates, the El Mujahed Detachment, 
in the Kamenica Camp.
On June 12, 2007, Milan Martic´ was 
convicted on 16 counts of persecution, 
murder, torture, deportation, attacks on 
civilians, wanton destruction of civilian 
areas, and other crimes against humanity 
and violations of the laws and customs of 
war and sentenced to 35 years imprison-
ment. Martic´ was Minister of the Interior, 
Minister of Defence, and President of 
the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous 
Region of Krajina (within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). He was found to have partic-
ipated, alongside other high-level Tribunal 
indictees — Radovan Karadžic´, Slobodan 
Miloševic´, Ratko Mladic´ and others — in 
a joint criminal enterprise whose aim was 
to ethnically cleanse areas of the former 
Yugoslavia through widespread and sys-
tematic crimes.
Convictions of Bosnian Serb Army offi-
cers Vidoje Blagojevic´ and Dragan Jokic´ 
for their involvement in the Srebrenica 
massacre were upheld by the Appeals 
Chamber on May 9, 2007. While affirming 
Blagojevic´’s conviction for crimes against 
humanity, the Appeals Chamber reversed 
charges of complicity in genocide against 
him and reduced his sentence from 18 to 15 
years. The Chamber confirmed judgment 
against Jokic´, Chief Engineer of the Zvornik 
Brigade of the Bosnian Serb Army, for aid-
ing and abetting exterminations, murder, 
and persecution by deploying equipment 
and personnel needed to carry out mass 
burials in and around Srebrenica. 
After being on the run for more than two 
years, Assistant Commander of Intelligence 
and Security for the Bosnian Serb Army 
Zdravko Tolimir was apprehended in east-
ern Bosnia by Bosnian Serb authorities on 
May 31, 2007, and later handed over to 
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European Union forces. His capture was 
not as fortuitous as it appeared, however. It 
was widely reported that Serbian authorities 
actually apprehended Tolimir in a Belgrade 
apartment and handed him over to Bosnian 
Serb authorities near the Republika Srpska 
border in an effort to appease both Serb 
ultra-nationalists and the European Union, 
which demands that Serbia increase coop-
eration with the Tribunal as a condition for 
membership consideration.
Tolimir is being charged as a part of a 
joint criminal enterprise aimed at forcing 
the Muslim population from the Srebrenica 
and Žepa enclaves and into areas outside 
the control of the Republika Srpska. His 
indictment includes charges of genocide, 
attributing him with responsibility for the 
murder of more than 7,000 Muslim men 
and boys killed in Srebrenica in 1995. He 
is also charged with other crimes arising 
from the Srebrenica massacre, including 
killing Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the 
towns of Potocˇari and Bratunac in east-
ern Bosnia and supervising the Bosnian 
Serb Army as it summarily executed more 
than 1,700 Muslim men and boys at the 
Branjevo Military Farm and the Pilica 
Cultural Center. Tolimir’s trial is now 
underway. He suffers from severe medi-
cal problems, however, and has refused to 
submit to medical treatment while in the 
Tribunal’s custody.
triBunal CoMpletion Strategy
The mandate of the Tribunal’s pros-
ecutor, Carla Del Ponte, was extended by 
Security Council resolution from September 
15 to December 31, 2007, to ensure a 
smooth transition to her successor. Many at 
the United Nations speculate that her suc-
cessor will be Belgian Serge Brammertz, 
who currently leads the UN investigation 
into the assassination of Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik al-Hariri. For continuity 
purposes, the preferred successor among 
senior prosecution staff is Del Ponte’s cur-
rent deputy, American David Tolbert.
Under the terms of the Tribunal’s com-
pletion strategy, all trials should be com-
pleted by 2009 and all appeals by 2010. 
The Tribunal has begun transferring a 
small number of cases involving low and 
intermediate-level accused to competent 
courts in the former Yugoslavia, allow-
ing the Tribunal to focus on those most 
responsible for the most serious crimes 
committed in the region. By allowing local 
courts to adjudicate these cases, and the 
concomitant exposure to issues of humani-
tarian law, it is hoped that these transfers 
will strengthen the rule of law in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
On June 11 the Tribunal transferred 
the case of Milorad Trbic´, a former secu-
rity officer of the Bosnian Serb army, to 
the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Prosecutor 
filed a Rule 11 bis motion for the referral 
to a domestic court in Bosnia. After con-
sidering the gravity of the crimes and his 
alleged level of responsibility, the Referral 
Bench agreed to the transfer. Thus far, ten 
individuals indicted by the Tribunal have 
been transferred to Bosnia, one to Serbia, 
and two to Croatia.
Of the 161 individuals indicted by the 
Tribunal, only four remain fugitives. These 
include high-level indictees Ratko Mladic´ 
and Radovan Karadžic´. Mladic´, the mili-
tary commander of the Bosnian Serb army, 
and Karadžic´, the president of the Bosnian 
Serb administration, are largely considered 
the masterminds behind many atrocities 
that occurred in Bosnia and Croatia. Del 
Ponte has called their continued evasion 
of justice a “permanent shadow” on the 




proSeCutor v. eMManuel 
nDinDaBahizi, JuDgMent,  
iCtr-01-71-a 
On January 16, 2007, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Appeals Chamber issued a judgment 
upholding the conviction and sentence of 
Emmanuel Ndindabahizi. Ndindabahizi, 
the Minister of Finance in the Interim 
Government of Rwanda, was charged in 
connection with the Gitwa Hill massacres, 
which took place between April 17–26, 
1994, and resulted in the death of thou-
sands of Tutsis. In addition, Ndindabahizi 
was alleged to be criminally responsible 
for his role in the killings that took place 
at various roadblocks in April and May 
1994.  
On July 15, 2004, the Trial Chamber 
convicted Ndindabahizi of the following: 
incitement to commit and complicity in 
genocide for the events at Gitwa Hill; 
extermination as a crime against human-
ity at Gitwa Hill; and instigating and 
aiding and abetting both genocide and 
murder as a crime against humanity for 
the killing of an individual known as 
Mr. Nors at the Gaseke roadblock. On 
appeal, Ndindabahizi challenged each of 
his convictions, as well as his sentence of 
life imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber 
vacated one count of genocide and one 
count of crimes against humanity based on 
a finding that the Trial Chamber erred in 
holding the Appellant responsible for the 
death of Mr. Nors, but affirmed the other 
convictions and held that the reversal on 
the counts relating to Mr. Nors did not 
affect the Trial Chamber’s sentence, which 
was affirmed.  
Among Ndindabahizi’s grounds 
for appeal was a challenge to the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that the Accused had 
visited the roadblock at Gaseke, where Mr. 
Nors was killed. Specifically, the Appellant 
argued that the Trial Chamber based its 
finding solely on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of a single witness which was incon-
sistent with other evidence and incorrect 
as to dates. The Appeals Chamber agreed, 
concluding that the lower court’s finding 
that the Appellant contributed to the kill-
ing of Mr. Nors was “based only on vague 
and unverifiable hearsay.” While hearsay 
evidence is not per se inadmissible in the 
ICTR, the Appeals Chamber noted, “[I]t is 
well established that a Trial Chamber must 
be cautious in considering such evidence.” 
The Appeals Chamber further held that 
the Appellant could not be held liable for 
instigating and aiding and abetting geno-
cide for the murder of Mr. Nors unless the 
Prosecutor established a link between the 
Appellant and the deceased. Instigating, 
the Appeals Chamber explained, means 
“prompting another person to commit an 
offence, thus requiring a subsequent crimi-
nal action,” while “a conviction for aiding 
and abetting presupposes that the support 
of the aider and abetter has a substantial 
effect upon the perpetrated crime.” Hence, 
the Appeals Chamber concluded that, 
“[n]o reasonable trier of fact could have 
concluded beyond reasonable doubt that 
the killing of Mr. Nors was a result attrib-
utable to the Appellant’s acts.”
Despite the finding that the Appellant 
could not be held liable for instigating 
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and aiding and abetting genocide for the 
murder of Mr. Nors, the Appeals Chamber 
affirmed the convictions for genocide and 
extermination as a crime against humanity 
with respect to Ndindabahizi’s involvement 
with the events at Gitwa Hill. Moreover, 
the Appeals Chamber found that although 
the Appellant could not be found respon-
sible for the death of Mr. Nors, the signifi-
cance of the crimes for which he had been 
convicted involving the events at Gitwa 
Hill alone warranted the Trial Chamber’s 
sentence of life imprisonment.
After concluding its review of 
Ndindabahizi’s challenges to the Trial 
Chamber’s judgment, the Appeals Chamber 
raised, propio motu, a final potential issue 
with respect to that judgment. Specifically, 
the Appeals Chamber considered whether 
the lower court had convicted the Appellant 
for the crime against humanity of extermi-
nation on alternative grounds. The issue 
arose due to the wording of paragraph 485 
of the Trial Judgment, which read, in part: 
[T]he Chamber finds that the Accused 
himself committed the crime of exter-
mination. He participated in creating, 
and contributed to, the conditions for 
the mass killing of Tutsi on Gitwa 
Hill on 26 April 1994, by distributing 
weapons, transporting attackers, and 
speaking words of encouragement 
that would have reasonably appeared 
to give official approval for an attack. 
Alternatively, the Chamber finds that 
by these words and deeds, the Accused 
directly and substantially contributed 
to the crime of extermination com-
mitted by the attackers at Gitwa Hill, 
and is thereby guilty of both instigat-
ing, and of aiding and abetting, that 
crime.” (Emphasis added)
As the Appeals Chamber recognized, 
the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
permit an accused to “be convicted for a 
single crime on the basis of several modes 
of liability.” However, the Chamber went 
on to explain that alternative convictions 
for several modes of liability are generally 
irreconcilable with the goal of expressing 
a judgment in an unambiguous scope as 
to the accused’s criminal responsibility. 
Specifically, because the mode of liabil-
ity under which individual responsibility 
is found may either increase or decrease 
the magnitude of the crime, the criminal 
liability of the accused must be unam-
biguously established. Upon reviewing the 
Trial Chamber’s holding in paragraph 485 
of the judgment, however, the majority 
of the Appeals Chamber determined that 
the Trial Chamber did not in fact con-
vict Ndindabahizi in the alternative, but 
rather intended to fully characterize the 
Appellant’s conduct through cumulatively 
referring to assorted of modes of liability. 
Judge Guney wrote a partial dissent 
on this issue, arguing that the majority 
did not adequately “assess the charac-
terization by the Trial Chamber of the 
Appellant’s criminal conduct,” but rather 
simply upheld the Trial Judgment’s find-
ing without a thoughtful consideration of 
its accuracy. Moreover, Judge Guney dis-
agreed with the Trial Chamber’s finding, 
upheld by the majority of the Appeals 
Chamber, that based on the circumstances 
of this case, Ndindabahizi’s conduct con-
stituted the “commission” of the act of 
extermination. The Trial Chamber found 
that extermination “may be committed less 
directly than murder, as by participation 
in measures intended to bring about the 
deaths of a large number of individuals, 
but without actually committing a killing 
of any person.” According to Judge Guney, 
this finding represented a departure from 
the appellate jurisprudence of both the 
ICTR and the ICTY, which defines the 
actus reus of extermination as “the act of 
killing on a large scale” or the “system-
atical subjection of a number of people to 
conditions of living that would inevitably 
lead to death.” Had the Trial Chamber fol-
lowed precedent, Judge Guney argued, the 
Appellant could not have been convicted 
for committing extermination as a crime 
against humanity, as the Trial Chamber 
found that the evidence did not establish 
that the Appellant himself killed any per-
son by his acts at Gitwa Hill.
proSeCutor v. anDre ntagerura, 
eMMauel BagaMBiki, anD SaMuel 
iManiShiMwe, iCtr-99-46-t
On July 7, 2006, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Appeals Chamber rendered its judg-
ment in the case of Prosecutor v. Andre 
Ntagerura, Emmauel Bagambiki, and 
Samuel Imanishimwe. The three Accused 
had been indicted on charges arising from 
large-scale attacks against Tutsi refugees 
in the prefecture of Cyangugu, Rwanda 
between April and June 1994. On February 
24, 2004, Trial Chamber III acquitted the 
Accused Ntagerura and Bagambiki on all 
charges. Imanishimwe, who had served 
as the acting commander of the Cyangugu 
military camp through July 2004, was 
also acquitted for the charge of complic-
ity in genocide. However, Imanishimwe 
was unanimously found guilty of murder 
as a crime against humanity, imprisonment 
as a crime against humanity, and torture 
as a crime against humanity. In addition, 
a majority of the Trial Chamber, Judge 
Dolenc dissenting, held that Imanishimwe 
was guilty under the theory of superior 
responsibility for the crimes of his subordi-
nates committed at the Gashirabwoba foot-
ball field, which included genocide, exter-
mination as a crime against humanity, and 
murder and cruel treatment as serious viola-
tions of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. 
Imanishimwe was sentenced to 27 years’ 
imprisonment. Following delivery of the 
Trial Chamber’s judgment, the Prosecutor 
and Imanishimwe each filed an appeal.  
On appeal, the Prosecution challenged 
the Trial Chamber’s refusal to consider 
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a basis 
upon which to find each of the Accused lia-
ble. The Trial Chamber had held that, if the 
Prosecutor intended to rely on JCE theory 
to hold the accused criminally responsible 
as principal perpetrator of the underlying 
crimes, rather than as an accomplice, “the 
indictment should plead this in an unam-
biguous manner and specify upon which 
form of [JCE] the Prosecutor will rely.” 
Having found that the Prosecutor failed to 
do so, the Trial Chamber refused to con-
sider the allegations of criminal responsi-
bility based on a JCE theory of liability. 
On appeal, the Prosecutor initially chal-
lenged the Trial Chamber’s finding that 
the indictments failed to properly allege 
JCE as a theory of liability. However, 
the Prosecutor subsequently acknowledged 
that the indictments did not plead JCE with 
sufficient specificity, and instead argued 
that the indictments had been cured of this 
defect and thus the Accused were “pro-
vided with clear and coherent information 
of the Prosecution’s intention to invoke 
joint criminal enterprise as a theory of lia-
bility.” Examining this claim, the Appeals 
Chamber first rejected the Prosecution’s 
claim that its Pre-Trial Brief contained 
sufficient factual allegations to put the 
Accused on notice of an intent to rely on 
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a JCE theory of liability, given that the 
Brief made “no specific mention of a joint 
criminal enterprise, a common criminal 
plan or any other synonym of that mode of 
criminal liability.” The Appeals Chamber 
did agree that the Prosecution alluded to 
JCE in its Opening Statement at trial, but 
it concluded that if the material facts of an 
accused’s alleged criminal activity are not 
disclosed to the Defense until the trial itself, 
it will be difficult for the Defense to conduct 
a meaningful investigation prior to the com-
mencement of the trial. Moreover, accord-
ing to the Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor 
did not, at any time, specify upon which 
form of JCE it was relying. Accordingly, 
the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial 
Chamber’s finding on JCE liability. 
Imanishimwe’s primary ground of 
appeal was that the Trial Chamber wrongly 
convicted him of superior responsibility 
for three crimes — genocide, extermina-
tion as a crime against humanity, and 
murder and cruel treatment as serious 
violations of the Geneva Conventions — 
in relation to the events which took place 
at the football stadium in Gashirabwoba. 
Specifically, Imanishimwe challenged the 
fact that the Trial Chamber permitted the 
Prosecutor to present evidence in support 
of the Accused’s superior responsibility 
for the crimes, despite having found that 
the Prosecutor did not properly plead such 
a mode of liability prior to trial. According 
to Imanishimwe, the conviction was invalid 
because he was unable to prepare a defense 
against a charge alleging responsibility as a 
superior for the Gashirabwoba massacre.  
The Trial Chamber had admitted the 
Prosecution’s evidence on Imanishimwe’s 
superior responsibility for the crimes 
committed at Gashirabwoba by citing the 
“Strong Evidence Passage” from the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber judgment in the case 
of Kupreškic´ et al. In that judgment, the 
Appeals Chamber wrote that it “might 
understandably be reluctant to allow a 
defect in the form of the indictment to 
determine finally the outcome of a case 
in which there is strong evidence pointing 
towards the guilt of the accused.” The Trial 
Chamber in the Ntagerura case interpreted 
this language to mean that it could consider 
evidence from the Prosecutor on events that 
had not been adequately pled in the indict-
ments. Notably, the Trial Chamber admit-
ted evidence regarding Imanishimwe’s 
superior responsibility, and ultimately con-
victed the Accused for the criminal acts of 
his subordinates at Gashirabwoba, despite 
finding that the relevant paragraphs of the 
indictment were “unacceptably vague.”  
In reviewing Imanishimwe’s appeal, 
the Appeals Chamber found that the 
lower court had improperly interpreted 
the Strong Evidence Passage from the 
Kupreškic´ judgment. The relevant lan-
guage, according to the Appeals Chamber, 
was intended to apply on appeal only, and 
specifically where an accused had chal-
lenged his or her conviction on the grounds 
that the charge on which the accused was 
convicted had been insufficiently pled. In 
that case, the Strong Evidence Passage 
could be used by the Appeals Chamber 
in determining whether to remedy a find-
ing of improper pleading by remanding 
the case to the Trial Chamber, rather than 
by automatically reversing the conviction. 
The Kupreški ´   decision could not, on the 
other hand, be used by a Trial Chamber 
to admit evidence on a defective charge. 
Indeed, the Appeals Chamber explained, 
a conviction may never be pronounced 
where the accused’s right to a fair trial 
has been violated because of a failure to 
provide him with sufficient notice of the 
legal and factual grounds underpinning the 
charges against him.  
The Appeals Chamber therefore agreed 
with Imanishimwe that the Trial Chamber 
improperly convicted him of responsibility 
as a superior for the crimes committed at 
the Gashirabwoba stadium.  Because the 
Trial Chamber had found that the evidence 
failed to establish Imanishimwe ordered 
the attack at Gashirabwoba or that he was 
present, the Appeals Chamber set aside 
the guilty verdict for the relevant counts. 
As a result, Imanishimwe’s sentence was 
reduced from 27 to 12 years in prison. 
proSeCutor v. vinCent 
rutaganira, CaSe no.  
iCtr-95-1C-t
The Trial Chamber for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
issued its judgment in the case of Prosecutor 
v. Vincent Rutaganira on March 14, 2005, 
convicting him of extermination as a crime 
against humanity. The Accused was sen-
tenced to six years in prison. Originally, 
Rutaganira was charged with several 
crimes, including conspiracy to commit 
genocide, genocide, murder as a crime 
against humanity, extermination as a crime 
against humanity, other inhumane acts as 
crimes against humanity, serious violations 
of Geneva Convention Common Article 
Three, and serious violations of Additional 
Protocol II. However, Rutaganira agreed 
to plead guilty by omission to the crime 
against humanity of extermination and in 
return the Prosecutor dismissed all other 
charges.
From May 1985 through the end of 
July 1994, Rutaganira was conseiller com-
munal of the Mubuga secteur in Rwanda, 
responsible for economic, social, and cul-
tural development in the secteur. By virtue 
of his office, Rutaganira served as a link 
between the inhabitants of his secteur and 
the local political structures.  
Rutaganira was accused of having played 
a leading role in the systematic extermination 
of Tutsis in the Catholic Church of Mubuga 
in April 1994. Specifically, the indictment 
against Rutaganira alleged that approxi-
mately one week after thousands of Tutsis 
had taken refuge in the Mubuga church, on 
or about April 14, 1994, the Accused gave 
orders to national and local policemen, as 
well as the Interahamwe (extremist Hutu 
Militia) and armed civilians, to launch an 
attack on the church. The indictment also 
alleged that Rutaganira himself took part 
personally in the attacks, which went on for 
several days. The massacres at the Mubuga 
church resulted in around 5,000 deaths and 
huge numbers of wounded.
While the Accused initially pled not 
guilty to all charges against him, he admit-
ted in a plea agreement concluded with the 
Prosecutor to having known that between 
April 8–15, 1994, thousands of Tutsi civil-
ians had taken refuge in the Mubuga 
church.  Moreover, Rutaganira admitted 
knowing that the church was attacked 
between April 14–17, 1994, by virtue of 
the fact that he had observed the attackers 
assembling around the church. Finally, 
Rutaganira admitted that, despite his posi-
tion and his having knowledge of the 
attacks, he failed to act to protect the Tutsi, 
either before or after the massacres.  
The ICTR Statute does not directly 
address guilty pleas. However, Rule 62(A) 
of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence provides that, upon an accused’s 
first appearance before the court, the Trial 
Chamber shall call upon the accused to 
4
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol15/iss1/8
44
enter a plea of guilty or not guilty on each 
count. In the case of a plea of guilty, Rule 
62(B) requires that the Trial Chamber 
confirm that the plea: (i) is made freely 
and voluntarily; (ii) is an informed plea; 
(iii) is unequivocal; and (iv) is based on 
sufficient facts for the crime and accused’s 
participation in it, either on the basis of 
objective indicia or of lack of any material 
disagreement between the parties about 
the facts of the case. Rule 62bis provides 
that the Prosecutor and Defense may agree 
that, upon the accused entering a plea of 
guilty, the Prosecutor will do one or more 
of the following: (i) apply to amend the 
indictment accordingly; (ii) submit that 
a specific sentence or sentencing range 
is appropriate; (iii) not oppose a request 
by the accused for a particular sentence 
or sentencing range. The Trial Chamber, 
however, is not bound by any agreement 
between the Prosecutor and Defense.  
On December 8, 2005, the Trial Chamber 
found the guilty plea of Rutaganira to have 
been done freely and voluntarily, and to 
have been an informed, unequivocal and 
sincere plea. The Chamber therefore pro-
ceeded to examine whether all the ele-
ments of the crime against humanity of 
extermination were present, and whether 
the form of the Accused’s participation in 
the perpetration of the crime was supported 
by the facts.
Article 3(b) of the ICTR Statute gives 
the Trial Chamber the power to prosecute 
someone for extermination as a crime 
against humanity when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against 
a civilian population that was targeted on 
national, political, ethnic, racial, or reli-
gious grounds. In addition, the Chamber 
looked to prior case law and found that, 
to be guilty of extermination, the Accused 
must have been involved in killings of 
civilians on a large scale. The Chamber 
found that the massacres committed at the 
Mubuga church had been perpetrated on 
a large scale and had caused thousands 
of causalities. The Chamber also found 
that the massacres had been perpetrated 
as part of a widespread and systematic 
attack. Finally, the Chamber found that 
the thousands of people mentioned were 
victims because they were members of the 
Tutsi ethnic group. Therefore, the Chamber 
found that the massacres committed at the 
Mubuga church amounted to extermination 
as a crime against humanity under Article 
3(b) of the Statute.
Having determined that the Mubuga 
church massacres satisfied the require-
ments of the crime against humanity of 
extermination, the Trial Chamber next 
turned to the issue of whether one can be 
convicted of aiding and abetting the com-
mission of the crime through omission, 
which is the sole mode of responsibility to 
which Rutaganira pled guilty. Complicity 
is not expressly included among the forms 
of liability enumerated in Article 6(1) of 
the ICTR Statute, which provides that a 
person shall be individually responsible for 
a crime if he “planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed, or otherwise aided and abetted 
in the planning, preparation, or execution 
of the crime.” However, both ad hoc tri-
bunals have held that aiding and abetting 
is a form of complicity, which consists 
of “practical assistance, encouragement, 
or moral support which has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of the crime.” 
Furthermore, the ad hoc tribunals have 
held that aiding and abetting as provided 
for in Article 6(1) may be carried out by 
omission, rather than exclusively by com-
mission. Accordingly, the Chamber held 
that participation by omission in extermi-
nation as a crime against humanity is cov-
ered by the aiding and abetting provision 
of Article 6(1) of the Statute.
Finally, the Trial Chamber considered 
whether Rutaganira himself was guilty of 
the crime against humanity of extermina-
tion by omission, considering the elements 
of aiding and abetting by omission. In 
determining the actus reus, the Chamber 
discussed whether the Accused had the 
authority to prevent the crime, and whether 
he had a legal duty to act which he failed 
to fulfill. The Chamber determined that, by 
virtue of his role as conseiller communal, 
Rutaganira had some power to protect 
the Tutsis who sought refuge at Mubuga 
church. Indeed, several witnesses who tes-
tified for the Defense to offer mitigating 
circumstances for purposes of sentencing 
revealed that, prior to the events of April 
1994, Rutaganira had readily opposed any 
decisions by the bourgmestre, or mayor, 
which struck him as unfair or inappropriate 
for the people in his secteur. Therefore, the 
Chamber found that Rutaganira “had the 
power to convene a meeting of the inhabit-
ants of his secteur and conduct discussions 
about the tragic events in order to prevent 
participation in the massacres that occurred 
at the church, at least by civilians.” The 
Chamber further found that Rutaganira had 
a legal duty to use his authority to lessen 
the harm of the crime, as international law 
places a duty on every public authority to 
act in order to protect human life.  Because 
Rutaganira failed to use his authority to 
prevent the violation of basic human rights, 
the Chamber held that the facts admit-
ted by the Accused proved that the actus 
reus requirements of aiding an abetting by 
omission were satisfied.
To determine whether there was suf-
ficient mens rea, the Chamber considered 
whether Rutaganira had knowledge of the 
principal perpetrator committing extermi-
nation as part of a widespread and system-
atic attack, and whether he knew that his 
conduct would further the perpetration of 
that crime. The Chamber found that by vir-
tue of his position as conseiller communal 
for Muguba secteur, “the Accused must 
have known about the serious events that 
were occurring in his sectuer and the crimes 
that were being perpetrated there on a large 
scale.” As a result, the Chamber found 
that Rutaganira knew that his omissions 
were part of a widespread and systematic 
attack targeted at a civilian population on 
ethnic grounds. Furthermore, Rutaganira 
was not only aware of his duties as con-
seiller communal but also “of his moral 
authority vis a vis the civilian population 
in his secteur.” He admitted that although 
he was conseiller he did not act to protect 
the Tutsis taking refuge in the church thus 
satisfying the mens rea requirement of the 
crime.  Therefore, the Chamber found that 
there was sufficient evidence to prove that 
Rutaganira was guilty of extermination as 
a crime against humanity because he aided 
and abetted that crime by omission. 
SpeCial Court For Sierra leone
Prosecutor v. BrimA, KAmArA &  
KAnu, CaSe no. SCSl-04-16-t
On June 20, 2007, the Trial Chamber 
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) delivered its judgment in the case 
of Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima 
Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, 
marking the first judgment issued by the 
Special Court. 
The three Accused were senior mem-
bers of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC), a faction rebel group 
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that broke away from the Sierra Leone 
Army and forcibly overthrew the demo-
cratically elected government of President 
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in May 1997. Each 
was convicted of either committing or 
bearing superior responsibility for: the 
war crimes of acts of terrorism, collec-
tive punishments, outrages upon personal 
dignity, pillage, violence to life, health and 
physical or mental well-being of persons, 
in particular murder, and violence to life, 
health and physical or mental well-being of 
persons, as mutilation; the crimes against 
humanity of rape, extermination, murder, 
and enslavement; and the recruitment and 
use of child solders as a serious violation 
of international humanitarian law. The sen-
tences are as follows: 50 years’ imprison-
ment for Brima, 45 years for Kamara, and 
50 years for Kanu.  
Among the theories of criminal liabil-
ity forwarded by the Prosecution was an 
allegation that the three Accused had par-
ticipated in a joint criminal enterprise that 
involved “gaining and exercising control 
over the population of Sierra Leone in 
order to prevent or minimize resistance 
to their geographic control.” The crimes 
alleged in the indictment, according to the 
Prosecutor, “were either actions within 
the joint criminal enterprise or were a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
[JCE].” The Defense challenged these alle-
gations on the ground that the Prosecution 
failed to properly plead JCE liability, argu-
ing that the common purpose to “take any 
actions to gain and exercise political power 
and control over the territory of Sierra 
Leone,” as such, did not amount to a spe-
cific crime and thus was too broad to prove 
the existence of a JCE.  
The Trial Chamber began its analysis by 
explaining the three forms of JCE: basic, 
systemic, and extended. Each of the three 
forms requires: (1) a plurality of individu-
als; (2) the existence of a common plan to 
commit a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the court; and (3) some level of contribu-
tion by the accused to the common plan. 
The differences among the three “forms” 
of JCE are found in the requisite mens rea. 
In the “basic” form, all co-perpetrators 
must share the “same criminal intention.” 
The “systemic” form is characterized by 
the existence of an organized system of ill-
treatment, such as a concentration camp, 
of which the accused must have personal 
knowledge as well as an intent to further 
the system of ill-treatment. Finally, under the 
“extended” form of JCE, an accused may be 
held responsible for crimes falling outside 
the scope of a common plan if the crimes 
were foreseeable and the accused willingly 
assumed the risk that such crimes would be 
committed by a member of the group.  
Turning to the specifics of the Defense’s 
challenge, the Trial Chamber agreed that 
the Prosecution had not properly pled 
liability for JCE against the former mem-
bers of the AFRC. First, the Trial Chamber 
found that, by alleging the “basic” and the 
“extended” forms of JCE disjunctively, the 
Prosecutor impeded the Defense’s ability to 
know the material facts of the JCE against 
them. The Trial Chamber then explained 
that the Prosecution did not sufficiently 
plead either the “basic” form of JCE or 
the “extended” form. Considering the lat-
ter form first, the Trial Chamber held that 
while “serious violations of international 
humanitarian law by certain members of 
armed forces during conflict are a foresee-
able consequence of such engagement in 
conflict,” this does not “necessarily make 
the act of engagement in armed conflict 
in itself an international crime.” Thus, the 
Trial Chamber rejected what it described 
as the Prosecutor’s attempt to charge the 
foreseeability of international crimes in 
a common purpose that is “not inher-
ently criminal.” Similarly, the Chamber 
held that the Prosecution had not properly 
pleaded the “basic” form of JCE because 
the common plan described in the indict-
ment — namely, to gain and exercise 
political power and control over the ter-
ritory of Sierra Leone — did not involve 
international crimes at the inception of the 
JCE. Finally, although the Trial Chamber 
recognized that a common purpose might 
change over time such that “a new JCE 
may emerge from a common purpose 
fundamentally different in nature and in 
scope from the initial common purpose,” 
the Chamber found that the Prosecution 
failed to “provide material facts of this 
new or changed common purpose in the 
[i]ndictment.”  
In its indictment, the Prosecution 
charged each of the Accused on four dif-
ferent counts of sexual violence: rape, 
sexual slavery, and other inhumane acts 
in the form of “forced marriage” as crimes 
against humanity, as well as outrages upon 
personal dignity as a war crime. Based on 
the evidence presented, the Trial Chamber 
convicted each Accused on one count of 
rape as a crime against humanity and one 
count of outrages upon personal dignity 
as a war crime, which the Chamber held 
“encompasses rape and/or other types of 
sexual violence as well as enslavement.” 
However, the Trial Chamber dismissed 
the charges of sexual slavery and other 
inhumane acts (forced marriage) as crimes 
against humanity on the ground that these 
charges were duplicative of the charges 
for the crime against humanity of rape and 
the war crime of outrages upon personal 
dignity.   
Justice Doherty dissented on the major-
ity’s dismissal of the charges relating to 
sexual slavery and other inhumane acts 
(forced marriage) as crimes against human-
ity. As to the first, Justice Doherty objected 
to the majority’s finding on the ground 
that the Defense had not challenged the 
duplicative nature of the charge until after 
the trial had concluded. With respect to the 
second dismissed charge, Justice Doherty 
wrote that the majority failed “to determine 
whether ‘forced marriage’ is of sufficient 
gravity to meet the requirements of an 
‘other inhumane act’” constituting a crime 
against humanity under the SCSL Statute. 
She stressed that the conduct contemplated 
as “forced marriage” does not “necessarily 
involve elements of physical violence such 
as abduction, enslavement or rape,” and 
thus was not duplicative of the charges for 
the crime against humanity of rape or the 
war crime of outrages upon personal dig-
nity. Furthermore, Justice Doherty argued 
that, by “vitiating the will of one party 
and forcing him or her to enter into a 
remain in a marital union, the victim is 
subject to physical and mental suffering” 
sufficiently grave to constitute the crime 
against humanity of other inhumane acts.    
The Trial Chamber judgment against 
the AFRC constitutes the first time an 
internationalized tribunal has found indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for the act of 
recruiting and using child soldiers in armed 
conflict. The issue was first addressed 
by the SCSL Appeals Chamber in March 
2004 in response to a defense motion argu-
ing that the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers was not a war crime in the context 
of a non-international armed conflict at 
the time the accused allegedly engaged in 
the practice in Sierra Leone. The Appeals 
Chamber rejected the claim, holding that 
the crime had been recognized under cus-
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tomary international law by November 
1996, the beginning of the SCSL’s tempo-
ral jurisdiction.  
In the case against the AFRC, the Trial 
Chamber found that the three accused rou-
tinely conscripted, enlisted, or used children 
under the age of 15 for military purposes. 
Thousands of these children were abducted 
throughout Sierra Leone, placed in AFRC 
training camps, and ultimately used in com-
bat. Notably, the Trial Chamber found that 
the “use” of child soldiers to “participate 
actively in the hostilities” is not limited 
to “participation in combat.” Rather, any 
labor or support “that gives effect to, or 
helps maintain, operations in a conflict con-
stitutes active participation, including the 
use of children to conduct logistical sup-
port, carry supplies, acquire food, procure 
equipment, carry messages, create trails, 
or act as decoys or human shields.” This 
finding is notable in light of the ongoing 
debates within the International Committee 
for the Red Cross and broader International 
Humanitarian Law community regarding 
the range of activities that may constitute 
“participation” in armed conflict.  
international CriMinal Court
the Situation in uganDa anD the 
CaSeS againSt CoMManDerS oF 
the lorD’S reSiStanCe arMy 
On August 10, 2007, the International 
Criminal Court’s (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber 
(PTC) II issued the Decision on Victims’ 
Application for Participation, granting six 
applicants victim status in the Case against 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) com-
manders and two applicants victim status 
in the Uganda Situation. Forty-two appli-
cations were deferred until the Victims 
Participation and Reparations Section 
reports additional information. The Court 
will also appoint a common legal repre-
sentative. 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and 
Office for Public Counsel for the Defense 
(OCPD) continue to argue that the crite-
ria for gaining victim status be applied 
restrictively. The prosecution emphasized 
that allowing participation of any person 
who claims to have suffered as a result 
of a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction 
would have three consequences of concern. 
First, broad inclusion would negatively 
impact the activities and limited resources 
of the Court. Second, the resources of the 
Victims and Witnesses Unit would be 
depleted by extending its protective efforts 
to an increased number of victims. Finally, 
broad inclusion could threaten the integrity 
of the trial and diminish perceptions that 
investigations are objective, particularly 
by labeling people “victims” at the pre-trial 
stage before actual crimes are established.
In determining the applicants’ status as 
victims, PTC II took a fact-based approach 
based on previous PTC I jurisprudence in 
the DRC Situation. Under Article 68(3) of 
the Rome Statute, the principle criterion is 
that the “personal interests” of applicant 
victims must be affected. Rule 85(a) of 
the Rules provides that, “‘victim’ means 
natural persons who have suffered harm 
as a result of the commission of any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.” The 
assessment of an applicant’s claim must 
analyze i) whether the identity of the appli-
cant as a natural person appears duly estab-
lished; ii) whether the events described 
constitute a crime within the Court’s juris-
diction; iii) whether the applicant claims to 
have suffered harm; and iv) most crucially, 
whether such harm appears to have arisen 
as a result of the event constituting a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
In a Situation, the applicant’s state-
ments must show to a high degree of prob-
ability temporally and territorially that the 
alleged incidents occurred. The determina-
tion must also consider the impact on the 
applicant’s personal interests. 
Peace talks in June concluded with a 
draft protocol on accountability and rec-
onciliation that would establish national, 
hybrid war crimes tribunals that try sus-
pected war criminals under traditional 
tribal justice systems. According to inte-
rior minister Ruhakana Rugunda, the pro-
tocol envisages “a unique legal system 
designed to achieve lasting peace and 
accountability.” There is some doubt, how-
ever, whether a national alternative to the 
ICC would provide sufficiently vigorous 
investigations and prosecutions. 
Achieving justice requires credible 
and independent prosecutions that meet 
international fair trial standards and are 
accompanied by sentences that reflect the 
gravity of the crimes. Under the principle 
of complementarity, if national prosecu-
tions are legitimate, the ICC does not have 
jurisdiction. According to Human Rights 
Watch, however, sham national proceed-
ings aimed at shielding the accused, or 
legitimate prosecutions accompanied by 
“slap-on-the-wrist” sentences will not suf-
fice to convince ICC judges that ICC pros-
ecution would be duplicative. Regardless, 
the government of Uganda remains obli-
gated to arrest and surrender LRA leaders 
to the ICC.
Ensuring justice is achieved — as 
opposed to focusing solely on reconcil-
iation and forgiveness — is important 
because trials provide accountability, pro-
mote stability, and deter future atrocities. 
Framing the issue as a peace-versus-justice 
debate can present a false sense of conflict 
that obstructs the achievement of both. 
Impunity does not lead to lasting peace; 
those interested in seeing the conflict end 
should insist on an outcome that includes 
both peace and justice. An International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) report 
concluded that the majority of respondents 
(citizens in eight counties most affected by 
the conflict) do not want the ICC to jeop-
ardize the peace process but do want some 
form of accountability for past crimes. 
This perceived conflict between peace 
and justice is belied by facts on the ground. 
Many groups have recognized that the ICC 
warrants played an important role in bring-
ing LRA leaders to the negotiating table. 
Similarly, despite ongoing peace talks, on 
September 8, 2007, Ugandan President 
Yoweri Museveni and DRC President 
Joseph Kabila signed an agreement to 
send joint military forces to dislodge LRA 
fighters from their stronghold in Garamba 
National Park, a jungle in northeast DRC. 
While this was a reaction to LRA failures 
to comply with peace-treaty benchmarks, 
the LRA has threatened retaliation and 
criticized the government for instigating 
additional violence. While this agreement 
may be mere government posturing, it indi-
cates that ICC warrants are less an obstruc-
tion to peace-building than the inability of 
parties to set and achieve peace-building 
goals. Characterizing the ICC warrants 
as obstructions to peace therefore appears 
to be more of a ploy by leaders trying to 
escape criminal liability than a serious 
obstruction to cooperation. 
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the Situation in the DeMoCratiC 
repuBliC oF the Congo anD the 
CaSeS againSt thoMaS luBanga 
Dyilo anD gerMain katanga
General Germain Katanga was trans-
ferred to The Hague in the early morning 
hours of October 18, 2007, becoming 
the second suspect admitted to ICC cus-
tody. Katanga is charged on the basis 
of individual criminal responsibility for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
including killings, pillaging, child recruit-
ment, and sexual enslavement. Katanga 
was chief of staff of the Patriotic Force 
of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), the military 
wing of the Front for National Integration 
(FNI) militia. Ethnically Lendu, the militia 
fought against the Union of Congolese 
Patriots (UPC), an ethnically Hema group 
formerly led by Thomas Lubanga, the first 
suspect transferred to the ICC. Although 
Congolese authorities arrested Katanga in 
2005, he was never tried, and his continued 
detention violated international fair trial 
norms. 
Katanga’s transfer helped the Court 
salvage credibility lost within the DRC 
due to the slow proceedings and the limited 
scope of charges brought against Lubanga. 
Sources in Ituri, however, said that the 
transfer was announced in Bunia (the 
capital of Ituri province) on the govern-
ment’s deadline for disarming Ituri militia, 
and served, at least partially, to foil the 
disarmament process. UPC officials said 
the ICC prosecution should not limit its 
attention to the Hema-Lendu conflict, but 
should broaden investigations to include 
other ethnicities, as well as state officials 
in Kinshasa and Kampala who funded and 
supported the local warlords. 
In February, Defense Counsel Jean 
Flamme filed a confidential request to be 
removed from the case, claiming the Court 
provided fewer resources to the Defense 
than to the Prosecution. Lubanga selected 
Catherine Mabille as Flamme’s replace-
ment.  The Court officially confirmed 
Mabille’s appointment on June 22, leaving 
a period in which Lubanga was unrep-
resented and proceedings were stayed. 
In May, Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) 
rejected Lubanga’s request for additional 
resources. The Paris Bar requested leave 
to intervene as amicus curiae to present 
a memo on the economic, material and 
human resources reasonably necessary for 
an effective defense. 
The Executive Committee of the 
International Criminal Bar (ICB) made 
a similar filing in June, requesting leave 
to file an amicus curaie brief support-
ing Lubanga’s May 25 pro se request for 
review of the Registrar’s decision denying 
him supplemental legal aid. On June 14, 
the Registrar granted the defense lim-
ited additional resources including one 
additional legal assistant. Moreover, the 
Registrar ordered co-counsel to immedi-
ately join the defense team, allowed former 
counsel to participate as a consultant for 
three months, and provided an investiga-
tion budget of €55,315. 
While ICC officials study feasibility 
issues, military courts in the DRC may 
offer hope for more immediate justice on 
the ground. In February, a military court in 
Bunia handed down death sentences to 13 
soldiers for massacring civilians in Ituri; 
in April 2006, a court found seven officers 
guilty of mass rape. Significantly, this 
marks the first time rape has been tried as 
a crime against humanity in the DRC. The 
military courts are highly controversial, 
however, and many critics cite problems 
such as trumped-up charges, civilian tri-
als, rampant political interference, and 
failure to conform to international fair trial 
standards. To improve the system, a mili-
tary criminal law advisor with the United 
Nations Mission in Democratic Republic 
of Congo (MONUC) is identifying and 
presenting resource needs to international 
donors. Basic resource challenges are dire, 
but MONUC officials say given proper 
support and guidance, the military justice 
sector is one of the greatest hopes for deal-
ing with impunity in the country. 
the Situation in DarFur anD the 
CaSeS againSt ahMaD haroun anD 
ali koSheiB
One of the greatest challenges facing 
the ICC is obtaining cooperation to pro-
mote peace and justice in Sudan, where 
the international community has done lit-
tle to address grave, widely documented 
human rights violations that continue to 
plague Darfur. As a result, the Sudanese 
government has flaunted its disregard for 
the international community, the laws of 
humanity and the requirements of the pub-
lic conscience.
During Secretary General Ban 
Ki-moon’s visit to Sudan in September, the 
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Ahmad 
Haroun — who the ICC has charged 
with 42 counts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, including murder, rape 
and persecution related to Darfur — was 
appointed to co-chair the committee that 
handles human rights complaints from 
Darfur. The other ICC accused, Janjaweed 
leader Ali Kosheib, had been held in 
state prison on charges being brought 
in national proceedings. Although U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1594 requires 
the Sudanese government to comply with 
ICC arrest warrants, the Government of 
Sudan released Kosheib from prison on 
lack of evidence. The ICC charged Kosheib 
with 51 counts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, including rape, torture, 
and murder. The government stated mul-
tiple times that it will not comply with ICC 
investigations on Darfur.
The Sudanese government created a 
Special Criminal Court on the Events in 
Darfur in June 2005. The court would 
serve as “a substitute to the International 
Criminal Court,” according to Sudan’s 
Chief Justice. In its first year, the Court 
only heard thirteen cases involving low-
ranking individuals primarily accused of 
minor offenses which did not reflect the 
gravity or scale of atrocities in Darfur. In 
its second year, the Court reviewed no new 
cases. Derived from a mix of Sharia law, 
Sudanese statutes and international law, 
the Court’s statute provides no definition 
of crimes against humanity, nor does it 
contain a prohibition on evidence obtained 
through torture. The statute contains broad 
immunity clauses and requires a severely 
high threshold of proof in the prosecution 
of rape, including testimony from four 
male witnesses. This presents a serious 
obstacle to promoting justice and account-
ability in a conflict where combatants have 
widely employed rape as a tactic aimed at 
the psychological and emotional subjuga-
tion of a civilian population.
In proceedings for the Situation in 
Sudan, PTC I entertained hearings relat-
ing to the standard for victim participation 
similar to those taking place in the Uganda 
Situation.
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hyBriD anD internationalizeD 
triBunalS
the extraorDinary ChaMBerS  
in the CourtS oF CaMBoDia
The Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the hybrid 
Cambodian-United Nations tribunal estab-
lished to try senior leaders of the Khmer 
Rouge has made positive strides over the 
past several months. Corruption allegations 
and low standards for hiring Cambodian 
staff, however, have raised concerns 
regarding the court’s transparency.  
The ECCC seeks justice for victims of 
a genocidal regime accused of killing 1.7 
million Cambodians. Pursuant to a 2001 
Cambodian statute establishing the court, 
the ECCC has jurisdiction over senior 
Khmer Rouge officials responsible for 
serious violations of Cambodian and inter-
national law perpetrated between April 17, 
1975, and January 6, 1979. To date, no 
senior Khmer Rouge officials have faced 
prosecution before a properly constituted 
court for international crimes committed 
during this period. A June 2003 agreement 
between Cambodia and the UN specifies 
the degree of international involvement 
with the court. The ECCC is a hybrid court 
with Cambodian and international judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys.  
On 13 June 2007, a panel of judges 
agreed on the Internal Rules governing 
ECCC’s procedure after stalling for over 
six months due to disagreements. Judges 
claim that the Internal Rules lead to “fair, 
transparent trials before an independent 
and impartial court.” The Internal Rules 
deal with a wide spectrum of issues and 
allow victims to join lawsuits as civil par-
ties to obtain collective and non-financial 
reparations, but not individual financial 
compensation. Prosecutors must prove 
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt to convict an accused. Moreover, 
the Internal Rules guarantee defendants 
will have one Cambodian and one foreign 
attorney.  
Certain key Khmer Rouge officials 
will never stand trial, including Pol Pot, 
the regime’s notorious leader who died 
in 1998 and Ta Mok, the ruthless mili-
tary commander who died in July 2006. 
Nevertheless, on July 18, 2007, ECCC 
prosecutors announced they submitted a 
list of five individuals to the tribunal to be 
considered for prosecution. Since then, the 
tribunal has taken custody of two key fig-
ures, including Kaing Guek Eav, known as 
“Duch” and Nuon Chea, “Brother Number 
Two.” Duch commanded the notorious 
S-21 prison at Tuol Sleng, where regime 
officials tortured and killed thousands of 
Cambodians. He had been detained since 
1999 for charges the Cambodian govern-
ment brought against him but was trans-
ferred to ECCC’s custody in late July. 
Duch, aged 65, is the youngest living 
leader of the regime. Nuon Chea, known 
as “Brother Number Two” due to his ser-
vice as Pol Pot’s second in command was 
arrested on September 19 and charged with 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.      
Despite progress, court observers 
have criticized the ECCC for corruption. 
Allegations that Cambodian employees 
paid court officials to obtain and main-
tain employment emerged last year. In 
response, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) contracted an inde-
pendent third party to audit the court’s 
hiring practices. The audit, which did not 
investigate monetary kickback allegations, 
ran between January 29 to February 8, and 
March 27–30, 2007. 
Chapman University School of Law 
professor John Hall wrote in a September 
21 article for the Wall Street Journal Online 
that the audit’s findings illustrate severe 
problems with the tribunal’s hiring prac-
tices. The audit claimed that the hiring pro-
cess was in such a poor state that, “recruits 
did not meet the minimum requirements 
specified in the vacancy announcements 
in terms of academic qualifications or pro-
fessional working experience.” The audit 
recommended that Cambodian staff be 
dismissed, and a new recruitment process 
begin under UNDP supervision. The audit 
suggested that the UNDP should consider 
withdrawing from the project altogether if 
Cambodian administrators failed to make 
fundamental changes to hiring practices.   
In response to the audit, the Project 
Board, which oversees the “Special Support 
of the Cambodian Side of the Budget for 
the ECCC,” took measures to improve the 
tribunal’s human resources management. 
In its September meeting, the board agreed 
upon measures to improve recruitment 
procedures of the Cambodian staff and 
to promote transparency. It remains to be 
seen if such measures will be implemented 
and will make a substantive difference in 
problematic hiring practices.   
the war CriMeS ChaMBer oF 
the State Court oF BoSnia  
anD herzegovina
With the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
nearing the end of its mandate, the War 
Crimes Chamber (WCC) of the State Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to 
grow in importance. When the conflict 
ceased, the country’s legal institutions 
were impaired and incapable of impartially 
trying those accused of atrocities dur-
ing the war.  It became apparent that the 
ICTY could only try a select number of 
suspects and needed help from domestic 
jurisdictions within the former Yugoslavia. 
In February 2002, the Office of the High 
Representative, responsible for implement-
ing civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords, 
and the ICTY agreed to transfer lower and 
mid-level suspects to domestic jurisdic-
tions. The WCC emerged through these 
circumstances in early 2005.
The WCC is one of three cham-
bers within the State Court of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s Criminal Division.  Sitting 
in Sarajevo, the WCC’s jurisdiction is lim-
ited to trying accused war criminals who 
perpetrated crimes in Bosnia. The WCC 
may hear both cases of ICTY transfers 
and sensitive cases initiated within local 
or national courts. Three-judge panels con-
sisting of two international judges and a 
local judge preside over trial and appellate 
chambers. The court’s international com-
ponents incorporate standards accepted in 
the international community. International 
judges are a temporary characteristic of the 
court, however, and the court will phase 
out these judges by 2010. Fully integrated 
into the Bosnian legal system, the WCC 
will continue to function indefinitely as 
its jurisdiction is not limited to a specific 
time period.    
Since its inception, the WCC has con-
victed twelve accused war criminals. The 
most common charges the court has brought 
against the accused are war crimes against 
civilians and crimes against humanity. 
According to the State Court’s web site, 
the court convicted one person at the trial 
level in 2005. In 2006, however, the WCC 
convicted eight individuals. Among the 
convicted was Radovan Stankovic´, the first 
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war criminal transferred from the ICTY 
to the WCC. The appellate chamber con-
firmed a lower court conviction, and con-
victed two individuals the appellate divi-
sion had earlier remanded for new trials.     
To date, the WCC continues to func-
tion successfully. Recent convictions at the 
trial level include three accused war crimi-
nals: Krešo Lucˇic´, a former commander 
of the Croatian Defence Council military 
police convicted of crimes against human-
ity; Nenad Tanaskovic´, a Bosnian Serb 
former reserve police officer convicted 
of crimes against humanity; and Niset 
Ramic´, a Bosnian Mulsim convicted of 
war crimes committed against Serbs. In a 
rare moment, the WCC acquitted Momcˇilo 
Mandic´, a Bosnian Serb and ex-interior 
minister, serving later as justice minister, 
who was accused of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
Along with its successes, the court has 
dealt with problematic issues. Despite the 
fact that distinct criminal codes operate 
in different courts throughout Bosnia, the 
WCC has had to apply the new set of laws 
that Parliament passed in 2005. These 
include a new criminal code and a new 
criminal procedure code. The laws are 
based on both Bosnian law and modern 
European law, incorporate elements of 
common law, and include changes to the 
investigative, trial and appellate stages. 
In September 2007, a group of defendants 
in the WCC’s custody began a hunger 
strike to protest the criminal code the court 
applies. The accused want the court to 
apply the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia’s (SFRY) Criminal Code, 
which envisages less severe punishments 
than the new code and does not include 
crimes against humanity. The discrepan-
cies in the different criminal codes pose 
problems that the Court must effectively 
resolve.                                   HRB
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and arrested numerous Tibetans celebrat-
ing the award. 
The five 14- and 15-year-old boys who 
remain in custody were originally held 
in the local police station, where visiting 
family members found Tseten bleeding 
from the head. Government officials did 
not allow family members to take Tsetsen 
for medical care. 
On September 10, non-uniformed secu-
rity officers moved the students to the town 
of Xiahe, two hours away. Xiahe officials 
deny family visitation, and refuse to reveal 
the location of the students. Tseten is cur-
rently being treated in a hospital in Xiahe 
for severe head injuries. It is unclear if he 
will be detained again after his treatment. 
Two 14-year-old boys, who were moved 
to Xiahe, were released on September 24 
under the conditions that each of their 
families pay fines of 4,000 yuan ($532 
U.S.) and that the boys be confined to their 
villages. Of the five students who remain 
in custody, some were reportedly beaten 
with electric prods.
Organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch have called for the release of these 
students and protection from further perse-
cution. Chinese government officials will 
not confirm that the students remain in 
custody.                                          HRB
Matthew Solis, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the United 
States for the Human Rights Brief.
Jennifer Jaimes, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers Latin 
America for the Human Rights Brief.
Rukayya Furo, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers Africa  
for the Human Rights Brief.
Ari Levin, a J.D. candidate at the Washington 
College of Law, covers the Middle East for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Morgan E. Rog, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers Europe  
for the Human Rights Brief.
Mahreen Gillani, an LL.M. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers Central 
and South Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
Alex Cheng, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers East and 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific for the Human 
Rights Brief.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL UPDATES  (Continued from page 39)
10
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol15/iss1/8
